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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

This

is

a successive, capital post-conviction case raising the question of whether

Appellant Gerald Ross Pizzuto,

Amendment because he
Mr. Pizzuto

is

is

Jr. is

constitutionally protected

under Atkins

intellectually disabledl

a capital inmate

conﬁned by the

from execution by the Eighth
v.

Virginia,

State of Idaho.

536 U.S. 304 (2002).

He was

convicted of ﬁrst-

degree murder and sentenced t0 death in Idaho County in 1986. Since then, there has been
extensive litigation over his convictions and sentence. Here, Mr. Pizzuto will only present the

background relevant

to the issues currently before the Court.

That background began on June
for post-conviction relief in Idaho

19,

County

2003,

when Mr.

District Court.

Pizzuto ﬁled a successive petition

32679 R. 1—10.2 In

that petition,

Mr.

Pizzuto alleged an Atkins claim. 32679 R. 1—10. The district court summarily denied the
petition Without an evidentiary hearing

order, the court

0n December

16, 2005.

32679 R. 309—1 1. In a two-page

found that the petition was untimely and, Without written elaboration, that

32679 R. 309—1 1.

“failed t0 raise a genuine issue of material fact.”

determined that the

district judge’s timeliness ruling

was

in error.

On appeal,

See Pizzuto

this

v.

it

Court

State,

146 Idaho

1

The authorities at one time referred t0 “mental retardation” rather than “intellectual disability.”
However, the latter phrase is now the accepted one. See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704
(2014). Mr. Pizzuto will accordingly use the expression “intellectual disability” except

when

quoting older material.
2

Citations t0 the record in case

Mr. Pizzuto refers
Below,

form above.
“R.
47709, in the form
V01._, p._.”

the earlier Atkins appeal, are in the

to the record in the instant case,

number

III,

p.

700, the district court took judicial notice 0f the

number 32679, R. Vol. V,

p.

1370

at the State’s request,

record in case

number 32679,

R. V01.

1

n. 1.

720, 727 (2008). For purposes 0f the appeal,

it

regarded Mr. “Pizzuto’s petition as being ﬁled

timely.” Id.

Nevertheless, the Court afﬁrmed the denial 0f post-conviction relief 0n the substance 0f

Mr. Pizzuto’s Atkins claim. See
failed

under Idaho Code

§

id. at

728—35.

It

did so because

it

thought Mr. Pizzuto’s petition

19-25 15A, which sets forth the state’s standards for intellectualSection 19-2515A(1)(b) deﬁnes the subaverage functioning

disability claims in capital cases.

prong 0f intellectual disability as comprising an IQ “0f seventy (70) 0r below.” Applying that
provision, the Court observed that there

72.” Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 729.

score

is

that the

was “only one IQ score”

in the record, “a

The Court recognized Mr. Pizzuto’s contention

Verbal IQ 0f

“that

an IQ

only accurate Within ﬁve points” given the standard error of measurement (“SEM”) and

72 was therefore within the range of intellectual

disability

under the

statute. Id.

But

it

rebuffed that proposition on the ground that “the legislature did not require that the IQ score be

within ﬁve points of 70 or below.

It

required that

it

be 70 0r below.”

Id.

Mr. Pizzuto then pursued the same claim in federal habeas and a panel of the Ninth
Circuit ruled

on

it,

with

its

ﬁnal opinion issued 0n December 31, 2019. In that ruling, the Ninth

Circuit concluded that this Court’s adjudication 0f Mr. Pizzuto’s Atkins claim

with the clinical deﬁnitions in place

528 (9th

embraced by the United

Cir.

2019) (per curiam).

time of the state court’s decision” in large part

SEM, and that

because of its confusion about the
principles

at the

States

Still,

“was inconsistent

as a result

its

opinion “violated” constitutional

Supreme Court. Pizzuto

the Ninth Circuit

v.

was unable

Yardy, 947 F.3d 5 10, 525,
to grant the writ, as

hamstrung by the federal habeas standard of review. Speciﬁcally, the habeas

statute

it

was

demands a

showing

caselaw that existed

that the state court unreasonably applied the

decision. See

id. at

522—23. In the Ninth Circuit’s View, even though

was erroneous under
Court precedent

in

current law,

2008

Ninth Circuit denied

its

errors

time of its

this Court’s

2008 opinion

were not so obviously forbidden by U.S. Supreme

as t0 satisfy that unforgiving test. See

relief,

at the

while emphasizing that

its

id. at

526—27. Consequently, the

disposition did “not preclude the Idaho

courts from reconsidering” the issue “in light of intervening events.” Id. at 534.

Consistent With the Ninth Circuit’s invitation, Mr. Pizzuto

moved to reopen his

post-

conviction Atkins case 0n September 25, 20193 so that the state courts could consider his
intellectual-disability claim

I,

pp. 13—14.

On January 6,

under the correct, contemporary
2020, the

district court

clinical standards

denied the motion as both

and law. R. V01.
late

and meritless.

R. V01. V, pp. 1370—84. Mr. Pizzuto ﬁled a timely notice 0f appeal on January 10, 2020. R.
V01. V, pp. 1385—96.

On March 24,

2020, Mr. Pizzuto ﬁled a motion t0 recall the remittitur in case number

32679, based 0n the same essential theory as the one urged here.
consolidate case

number 32679 with

must be granted

either through this appeal or a recall

More

3

facts

He

also submitted a

motion

to

the instant appeal. Mr. Pizzuto takes the position that relief

of the

remittitur.

and procedural history are presented below where necessary.

Mr. Pizzuto ﬁled his Rule 6O motion based on an earlier version 0f the Ninth Circuit’s opinion,
see Pizzuto v. Blades, 933 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), which was identical in all
material respects to the ﬁnal, December 2019 version mentioned above. Because it superseded
the previous one, Mr. Pizzuto relies upon the latter opinion except When he is discussing the
timeliness of his Rule 60 motion, Which was triggered by the earlier Ninth Circuit decision.

ISSUES PRESENTED

II.

The

issues presented

0n appeal

ON APPEAL

are:

A.

Whether Mr. Pizzuto’s

I.R.C.P. 60(b)

motion was timely.

B.

Whether Mr. Pizzuto’s

I.R.C.P. 60(b)

motion was meritorious.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

III.

“The decision

to grant or

discretion 0f the trial court.”

deny a motion under I.R.C.P. 60(b)

Eby

v.

State,

is

committed

148 Idaho 731, 734 (2010).4 However, “[t]he

interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is a matter 0f law over

free review.” Id.

Furthermore, a

district court

“With the applicable legal standards.”

Id.

60(b) motion without a hearing because

because

it

it

t0 the

abuses

its

discretion

When it

which

this

Court has

acts inconsistently

In this case, the district court denied Mr. Pizzuto’s

felt

he had the legal basis t0 bring

it

earlier

and

determined that prior counsel’s mistakes were categorically not the type of errors that

could trigger the reopening of the action. R. V01. V, pp. 1375—83. Mr. Pizzuto submits that
these are essentially legal conclusions and do not depend

appellate deference. In that regard,

it is

0n any

factual

ﬁndings deserving of

also relevant that the district judge

Who

denied the

motion was not the one Who observed prior counsel’s conduct When she made the mistakes
issue here. Therefore, Mr. Pizzuto believes that de

alternative, if a stricter standard applies,

4

In this brief, all internal quotation

unless otherwise noted.

novo review

he contends that

marks and

it is

is

at

appropriate. In the

satisﬁed.

citations are omitted,

and

all

emphasis

is

added

ARGUMENT

IV.

Two
(2)

Whether

issues are presented

it

was

on appeal:

(1)

whether the Rule 60(b) motion was timely; and

meritorious. Mr. Pizzuto addresses each in turn.5 Because the different

aspects 0f the case are so interrelated, he incorporates every section of this brief into every other

section.

A.

The Rule

60(b) Motion

Motions made pursuant

t0

Was

Timely

Rule 60(b)(6) must be ﬁled “Within a reasonable time,”

I.R.C.P. 60(c)(1), and, as set forth below, Mr. Pizzuto’s was.

“What

constitutes a reasonable time” under

case.” Fisher Sys. Leasing

App. 2001). In Davis

v.

motion as timely Where
for seeking t0 alter or

Pizzuto’s motion

August

14, 2019.

was

v.

Rule 60(b)

“is

based upon the facts of each

J & J Gunsmithing & Weaponry Design,

135 Idaho 624, 628 (Ct.

Parrish, 131 Idaho 595, 597 (1998), this Court categorized a Rule 60(b)

it

was ﬁled roughly three months

amend the judgment. As
the

new Ninth

after the litigant

had notice of the basis

elaborated 0n below, the predicate for Mr.

Circuit opinion,

which was

originally

The Rule 60(b) motion was ﬁled on September

handed down on

25, 2019. R. V01.

Having ﬁled Within forty-two days of the triggering event, Mr. Pizzuto acted
assembling a detailed motion in

this

complex

capital case involving

history and difﬁcult scientiﬁc subj ect matter. Per Davis, his motion

5

I,

p. 13.

diligently in

an extensive procedural
is

not time-barred.

Mr. Pizzuto reserves the right to respond in his reply brief t0 any arguments raised by the State
for afﬁrmance that were not relied upon by the district court. Because Mr. Pizzuto does not
currently know what arguments the State Will make in that regard, he does not address them here.

Rej ecting that straightforward logic, the

untimely because, in the judge’s View,
after the

The

it

had

to

district court

be ﬁled within a reasonable time

Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mr. Pizzuto’s

district court’s

theory

is

held that the Rule 60(b) motion was

own habeas

appeal. R. V01. V, pp. 1376—78.

a non-sequitur. Regardless of Whether Hall might have served as a

valid triggering point for a diﬂerent Rule 60(b) motion, the question at
Circuit’s opinion

was a

Rule 60(b) motion

is

valid triggering point for the motion that

appropriate

justifying relief.” Miller

timeliness purposes

is

after Hall, not

When there

are “unique

was

hand

is

whether the Ninth

actually ﬁled. In Idaho, a

and compelling circumstances

Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 349 (1996). Thus, the sole question for

v.

Whether such unique circumstances are presented by the

Ninth

fact that the

Circuit declared this Court’s resolution 0f Mr. Pizzuto’s Atkins claim t0 be unscientiﬁc and,

under today’s law, unconstitutional. The
question, but the answer

is

yes.

district court

A federal court With jurisdiction over the issue and n0 obligation

t0 say so nevertheless felt obligated t0 point out

and

did not even attempt t0 address that

to invite further proceedings here.

how problematic

the

2008 Pizzuto opinion

is,

That surely qualiﬁes as a unique and compelling

circumstance.

Furthermore, the

district court’s

fundamental premise of the

reasoning does not hold up even on

district court’s analysis is that

its

own terms. The

Hall and the developments in the

science 0f intellectual disability gave Mr. Pizzuto everything he needed in order t0

make

arguments that he advanced in his Rule 60(b) motion. R. V01. V, pp. 1376—78. That
Starting with the science, the

was

t0 ignore the

SEM. But

as the

most signiﬁcant scientiﬁc ﬂaw

Ninth Circuit explained

in this Court’s

at length, that

is

the

incorrect.

2008 opinion

approach was just as

unscientiﬁc

when

(“Pizzuto

correct that the Idaho

is

the Court undertook

it

in

2008

as

it is

today. See Pizzuto,

947 F.3d

at

525

Supreme Court’s application 0f a hard IQ-70 cutoff was

inconsistent with the clinical deﬁnitions in place at the time 0fthe state court ’s decision”).

Indeed, Mr. Pizzuto called this Court’s attention t0 the margin 0f error in the prior appeal. See
Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 729 (“Pizzuto argues that an

The Court simply disagreed With him. See
score be Within

ﬁve points of 70 0r below.

scientiﬁc change

0n

this issue.

community that could have

It

id.

It

IQ score

is

only accurate within ﬁve points.”).

(“[T]he legislature did not require that the IQ
required that

it

be 7O or below”). There was n0

follows that Mr. Pizzuto had no valid event in the scientiﬁc

legitimately triggered a Rule 60(b) motion, and the district court

was

in error t0 hold t0 the contrary.

The

district court’s interpretation

of the legal developments around Atkins

is

equally

unsupported. There, the district court’s principal rationale was that Hall provided Mr. Pizzuto a
basis t0 assert his argument. R. V01. V, pp. 1376—78.

otherwise. In Atkins, the

intellectual function

at

309

n.5.

disability,

Supreme Court noted

which take

0f both Atkins and Hall proves

is

“between 70 and 75 or lower.” 536 U.S.

the Court emphasized that “[t]he clinical deﬁnitions of intellectual

into account that

IQ scores represent a range, not a ﬁxed number, were a

fundamentalpremise ofAtkins.” Hall, 572 U.S.

embraced byAtkins

text

explicitly that “the cutoff IQ score for the

prong” of intellectual disability

And in Hall,

The

itself.

See Smith

v.

at 720.

Stated differently, the

SEM was

Sharp, 935 F.3d 1064, 1077 (10th Cir. 2019)

(acknowledging that “[t]he Supreme Court in Atkins accepted

clinical deﬁnitions for the

0f the term mentally retarded,” and that “Atkins clearly establishes that

meaning

intellectual disability

must be assessed,
cert. pet.

under the existing

at least in part,

ﬁled (19-1 106) (Mar.

2,

clinical definitions,” including the

SEM),

2020).

In short, the scientiﬁc and legal landscape surrounding Mr. Pizzuto’s claim did not

meaningfully change with medical advancements 0r

The relevant science and law already existed

Court.

misunderstood them in

its

opinion.

It

new precedents from the U.S. Supreme
in 2008,

and the Court simply

would not be reasonable

t0 expect

Mr. Pizzuto

t0 articulate

an argument the Court had already rejected. The real change took place when the Ninth Circuit
issued a published opinion stating that this Court’s 2008 opinion
science and the law. That

was

was

inconsistent with the

the only valid triggering event for the Rule 60(b) motion.

Because the motion was ﬁled within a reasonable time of that event—only forty—two days later—
it

was

timely.

Finally, t0 the extent the district court believed the

Rule 60(b) motion was untimely

because a post-conviction petition asserting the same theory would have been barred by the
limitations period, see infra at 14—15, that too

motion

in a collateral challenge,

its

is

tardiness vel

provision in I.R.C.P. 60(c)(1), see Stuart

v.

incorrect.

non

State,

is

When a prisoner ﬁles

a Rule 60(b)

judged under the “reasonable time”

128 Idaho 436, 437 (1996), not the limitations

period in the post—conviction statutes.

By misconstruing the precedents and

scientiﬁc authorities to avoid the foregoing

conclusions, the district court ran afoul 0f “the applicable legal standards,” and thereby abused

its

discretion. Eby, 148 Idaho at 734.

The

district court’s timeliness ruling

and the merits 0f the Rule 60(b) motion should be considered 0n appeal.

should be reversed,

The Rule

B.

On the merits,

60(b) Motion

there are

0f the Ninth Circuit opinion:

Was

two bases

Meritorious

for retracting the previously entered judgment in light

(1) the opinion erodes the legal

2008 decision denying Mr. Pizzuto’s Atkins claim; and
negligence and

its

1.

To

and scientiﬁc bases for

(2) the opinion

this Court’s

exposes prior counsel’s

consequences. Mr. Pizzuto takes each in turn.

The Legal And

Scientiﬁc Bases For This Court’s 2008 Decision

begin, the state courts’ treatment 0f Mr. Pizzuto’s Atkins claim

was revealed

as

erroneous by the Ninth Circuit under the latest scientiﬁc and legal standards. Additional

proceedings are thus justiﬁed in order for the state courts t0 utilize the correct standards and
ensure that an intellectually disabled

man is

not executed, an event that would be plainly

forbidden under the Constitution.

As mentioned,

the U.S.

Supreme Court announced

in Atkins that the Eighth

Amendment

bars the execution 0f intellectually disabled offenders. Atkins indicated that medical literature

deﬁned

intellectual disability as

comprising three features: (1) subaverage intellectual

ﬁmctioning; (2) signiﬁcant limitations in adaptive

536 U.S.
75 or lower”

is

at

same

and

(3) manifestation before

318. In a footnote, the Atkins Court observed that “an IQ between 7O and

“typically considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function prong 0f the

mental retardation deﬁnition.”
the

skills;

Id. at

three categories. See Idaho

309

n.5.

Code

§

Idaho’s legislative codiﬁcation ofAtkins tracks

19-2515A(1). Importantly, though, the statute

deﬁnes the ﬁrst prong as an IQ 0f 70 or below. See

§ 19-25 15A(1)(b).

In Mr. Pizzuto’s case, this Court

from 1985. Pizzuto, 146 Idaho

had before

According

at 729.

it

“only one IQ score,” “a Verbal IQ 0f 72”

t0 this Court, the

the court explained, “the legislature did not require that the

or below.

It

required that

The Ninth

Circuit

it

be 70 0r below.”

deemed

that

72 was not low enough. As

IQ score be Within ﬁve points of 70

Id.

approach “inconsistent with the

clinical deﬁnitions in

place at the time of the state court’s decision.” Pizzuto, 947 F.3d at 525.
to those deﬁnitions, intellectual disability

IQ of approximately 70 0r below.”

It

noted that pursuant

“does not require an IQ of 70 0r below;

Id. at

it

requires ‘an

526 (quoting American Psychiatric Association,

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 0f Mental Disorders 49 (4th ed. 2000) (“DSM-IV”) (emphasis
in original».

The Ninth

Circuit in Pizzuto

drew from Hall the lesson

represents a range rather than a

ﬁxed number”

minus ﬁve points.”

By way of example,

t0 reﬂect a range

may not
“strict

Id. at 5 19.

between 66 and 76.”

cut off the inquiry

IQ

test score cutoff

when

of 70”

Id.

since “[e]ach

IQ

“[a] score

test

0f 71

that

“an IQ

has a[n

.

.

.

is

(quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 713).

test score

SEM] 0f plus

0r

generally considered

“A

court, therefore,

a defendant scores between 70 and 75 on an IQ test,” as a
is

constitutionally unacceptable. Id.

“In effect,” the Ninth

Circuit continued, Hall “expands the operational deﬁnition 0f mental retardation t0 75” in light

0fthe

SEM.
As

Id. at

526.

the Ninth Circuit

saw

principles. Instead, substituting

it,

its

this

Court was not faithful t0 those well-established scientiﬁc

own perceptions

for the “clinical standards, [this] Court

required an offender to establish an IQ of 70 or below under

all

circumstances, regardless 0f the

offender’s deﬁcits in adaptive functioning.” Id. “In doing so,” the Ninth Circuit went 0n, this

10

Court “failed t0 recognize that

who

IQs between 70 and 75

DSM-IV

at

41—42).

As

‘it is

possible to diagnose Mental Retardation in individuals with

exhibit signiﬁcant deﬁcits in adaptive behavior.” Id. (quoting

a consequence, this Court’s opinion was, in the words 0f the Ninth

Circuit, “contrary t0 the clinical deﬁnitions in place at the time.” Id.

Despite acknowledging this Court’s mistakes, the Ninth Circuit was constrained to

uphold

its

mandate. This was only because, t0 the Ninth Circuit’s mind, “[a]t the time of the

was not

were required

state court’s decision in

2008,

intellectual disability in

accordance with these prevailing clinical definitions.”

it

the Ninth Circuit observed that “[i]t

prohibited

is

yet apparent that states

now

clear” that this Court’s

by more recent proclamations from

Brumﬁeld v. Cain, 135
(2017). Id. at 528.

S. Ct.

the U.S.

2269 (2015), and Moore

As mentioned

earlier, the

method

Supreme Court
v.

Texas (Moore

is

in the

Ninth Circuit went out of its

deﬁne

Id.

Nonetheless,

constitutionally

form ofHall,

137

I),

t0

S. Ct.

way t0

1039

stress that its

opinion did “not preclude the Idaho courts from reconsidering” their rulings “in light of
intervening events,” such as the three U.S.

The time

T0

see

Supreme Court opinions just

for such reconsideration is

Why,

it is

listed. Id. at

now.

important to understand the legal effect 0f the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.

Mr. Pizzuto has a federal constitutional and statutory right to seek habeas
in the

United States court system. See Boumediene

that the

v.

relief from his sentence

Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008) (noting

Suspension Clause protects a prisoner’s right t0 seek the writ of habeas corpus); see also

28 U.S.C.
courts).

534.

§

2254 (codifying the

The Ninth

right to pursue

habeas review of state judgments in the federal

Circuit has jurisdiction over any federal habeas issues that

11

come

to the fore in

the State 0f Idaho. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 1291, 1294.
Circuit’s

comments about Mr. Pizzuto’s case

the post-conviction proceeding here.

should.

is

unconstitutional.

difﬁcult t0 imagine

Miller, 129 Idaho at 349, than

When an

statute.

for this Court t0

stands, this Court’s

While the Ninth Circuit could not

deny

relief,”

relief now.

The Ninth

is

therefore satisﬁed.

how

Circuit

constitutionally problematic

was incapable of remedying

it

the

identiﬁed in this Court’s opinion because 0f the rigid restrictions of the federal habeas

If this

Court

now

t0 bring a valid Eighth

turn,

now

opinion from a competent court uncovers the

What’s more, the Ninth Circuit opinion underscores

it

law for purposes of

more “unique and compelling circumstances justifying

unlawfulness 0f a previous judicial decision, and Rule 60(b)

errors

it

Ninth

unconstitutionality because 0f the limitations of habeas review, this Court can and

It is

would be

principles, the

are a correct statement 0f the

follows that under the law, as

It

resolution 0f Mr. Pizzuto’s Atkins claim

remedy the

Given those basic

would

Violate

declines to do the same,

Amendment

it

will

mean there

is

n0 forum

his death sentence

proceeding. See generally Felker

v.

Mr. Pizzuto

claim that renders his execution unconstitutional. That, in

Mr. Pizzuto’s Fourteenth Amendment due process right

Which he can challenge

for

and

to a

ﬁmdamentally

fair

t0

have a vehicle in

post-conviction

Turpin, 5 18 U.S. 651 (1996); Pennsylvania

v.

Finley, 481

U.S. 551 (1987).

Apart from highlighting the conﬂict between
at the

this

Court and the clinical standards in place

time of its ruling, the Ninth Circuit also underscored the fact that the clinical standards

have evolved since then. See Pizzuto, 947 F.3d

at

534—35 (“Although the Idaho courts

Pizzuto’s Atkins claim in 2008, they did so Without the beneﬁt of

12

.

.

.

the

most recent

rej ected

iterations

of

the

.

.

.

Most notable

clinical standards.”).

the Flynn effect.

“The Flynn

over time” as

norms become outdated.

test

particular thoroughness put

that

in that regard is the

Ninth Circuit’s commentary on

effect refers to the observation that

it,

Id. at

“the Flynn Effect

528 n.1

is

1.

IQ scores have been increasing

As one

court to cover the matter With

well established scientiﬁcally” and

an older IQ score should be “correct[ed]” by a downward adjustment that reﬂects

ago the

test

was given and When

it

was normed. United States

v.

Hardy, 762

F.

it

means

how

long

Supp. 2d 849,

866 (E.D. La. 2010).

The Ninth

Circuit recognized in Mr. Pizzuto’s case that the Flynn effect has been

endorsed by recent clinical standards, including the eleventh edition of the manual put out by the

American Association 0n

Intellectual

DSM-V. See Pizzuto, 947

F.3d

DSM-V was published in 2013.

at

and Developmental Disabilities (“AAIDD-l

526

n. 10.

The AAIDD-ll was published

See Hall, 572 U.S.

at

decision 0n Mr. Pizzuto’s Atkins claim in 2008, these sources had not yet
closing

its

come

Court released

its

into being. In

opinion, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that because 0f that timing this Court had been

unable t0 effectuate the current consensus 0f the medical community, which
‘best practices require recognition

an IQ score.” Pizzuto, 947 F.3d
Before

this Court, the

advise[s] that

at

norms) are used in the assessment 0r interpretation of

535 (quoting

AAIDD—ll

at 37).

only IQ score under review was a 72, Which was obtained 0n the

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales, Revised (“WAIS-R”)

WAIS-R was

“now

of a potential Flynn Effect when older editions of an

intelligence test (with corresponding older

729. “The

and the

2010 and the

in

When this

705, 727 n.1.

1”)

originally

normed

in 1978.”

13

in 1985.

Hardy, 762

See Pizzuto, 146 Idaho

F.

Supp. 2d

at 863.

Due

at

t0 the

Flynn

effect, there is

Compensating for the Flynn

at 860.

statute

under

“an inﬂation rate of about 0.3 points per year

normed.”

Remember that

72 drops to 69.9.

demands a showing of an IQ of 70 or below. See Idaho Code

this Court’s rigid

statute,

effect, then, the

after the test is

Id.

Idaho’s

§ 19-25 15A(1)(b).

Even

approach, that would bring Mr. Pizzuto Within the protection 0f the

providing yet another reason to reopen the case.
In a perfunctory

few sentences, the

district court

found that the Ninth Circuit opinion was

an insufﬁciently compelling reason t0 reopen the case because

“[i]t is

not appropriate to allow a

catchall provision to circumvent the parameters of’ Idaho’s post-conviction regime. R. Vol.

p. 1383.

The

district court

held that View based 0n

petition asserting the theory at issue here

statutory

scheme

To

speculation that a separate post-conviction

its

would have been untimely. R. V01. V,

logic does not withstand scrutiny, for there

is

V,

1383. That

p.

no incompatibility between Rule 60(b) and the

for post-conviction actions.

the contrary, as the Court has reiterated in a

number of capital post-conviction

the rules 0f civil procedure generally govern such proceedings. See, e.g., Stuart

Idaho 35, 40 (2010); Pizzuto

v.

State,

149 Idaho 155, 159 (2010); Rhoades

247, 249 (2009). Needless to say, I.R.C.P. 60(b)

is

v.

v.

State,

State,

cases,

149

148 Idaho

a part of the rules 0f civil procedure. In

fact,

the Court has applied Rule 60(b) in particular to post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g., Eby, 148

Idaho

at

734—38. Like any

civil litigant,

judgment entered against him
to consider that 60(b)

Mr. Pizzuto was

entitled to seek 60(b) relief for the

in the original Atkins proceeding.

motion on

its

The

district court

own terms, and decide whether the

14

was obligated

rule’s standard

was

satisﬁed. There

was n0 cause

t0 consider in the calculus

successive post—conviction petition that

It is

likewise helpﬁll to

was never

remember that

What might have happened

to a

ﬁled.

in post-conviction matters “the court shall take

account 0f substance regardless 0f defects of form.” Idaho Code § 19-4906(a).6 Rule 60(b)(6)
similarly ﬂexible: as one court has put

t0

d0 justice in a particular case.” Harrell

(5th Cir. 1992) (quoting

power

the provision “is a grand reservoir 0f equitable

it,

v.

DCS Equip.

Moore’s Federal Practice

1]

is

Leasing Corp, 951 F.2d 1453, 1458

60.27[2], at 60—295).7

Given the tenor 0f

both § 19-4906(a) and Rule 60(b)(6), the chief factor below should have been the demands of
justice.

It

was

error for the district court t0 instead apply a hyper-technical

pleading rules that do not even apply to Rule 60(b) motions.

By doing

not comport “with the applicable legal standards,” Eby, 148 Idaho

abused

its

discretion.

proper result

is plain.

Once

this

Justice is not accomplished

6

Commonwealth,

v.

Idaho Code

§

19-4906(a)

In capital cases, the

is

---

so, the district court

When an

S.W.3d

----,

a part of the

2020

intellectually disabled

at the

did

734, and consequently

Court Views the case through the appropriate, equitable

executed on the basis of an opinion that was unscientiﬁc

See White

at

framework based on

time and

is

man

lens, the

is

unconstitutional now.

WL 1847086, at *2—3 (Ky. 2020) (refusing t0

Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (“UPCPA”).

UPCPA controls unless there is a conﬂicting provision in Idaho Code

2719, Which was written speciﬁcally for death penalty matters. See Fields

v.

State, 155

§ 19-

Idaho

532, 534—35 (2013). Mr. Pizzuto submits that, with respect to the question at issue here, there

no language
7

in §

19-2719 that would supersede the equitable approach laid out in

I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)

authority

is

is

§ 19-4906(a).

identical to Fed. R. CiV. P. 60(b)(6). Federal cases are therefore persuasive

0n the scope 0f the

latter.

See Stewart

v.

Arrington Constr. Ca, 92 Idaho 526, 529

(1968) (“Since our rules of civil procedure are substantially similar to the Federal Rules 0f Civil
Procedure, cases construing the federal rules are persuasive”).
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allow a defendant t0 waive the same type 0f claim and remanding for an evidentiary hearing

because Atkins erected “an absolute bar against imposing the death penalty on the intellectually
disabled”).

In these various ways, this Court’s opinion has been uprooted both legally and factually

by the Ninth

Circuit decision, and the case ought to be

remanded

t0 allow for a full, fair

consideration of Mr. Pizzuto’s intellectual disability under the current medical standards and

caselaw.

2.

Prior Counsel’s Negligence

Mr. Pizzuto’s second ground for reactivating the case ﬂows from the serious missteps

made by his

prior attorney in the initial Atkins post-conviction proceedings, a type of Rule 60(b)

theory that has been expressly approved 0f by this Court. See Eby, 148 Idaho at 734—38.
detailed below, those missteps induced the Ninth Circuit to later

deny him habeas

As
most

relief, the

dire repercussion imaginable.

In a nutshell, prior counsel fell short of her duties

request for evidentiary development. Although counsel
testing,” she “did not notice the

to

have done had she wished

(Ct.

t0

have

it

rationale that because the district judge

n.3.

by the

“moved

for additional psychological

motion for a hearing,” Pizzuto, 947 F.3d
adjudicated, see, e.g., State

App. 1996). The Ninth Circuit remarked

order entered

by needlessly undercutting her own

v.

at

516, Which she ought

Ayala, 129 Idaho 91

that counsel’s omission likely

1,

915

ﬂowed from the

“had erroneously denied the motion t0 disqualify, any

court on the question of testing

That interpretation of counsel’s motivation

is

16

would be void.”

reinforced

by

Pizzuto, 947 F.3d at 517

a subsequent pleading from

counsel, Where she suggested that any order entered

by the judge was “void and 0f n0

effect.”

32679 R. 225. Such logic was deeply ﬂawed.

As an

initial matter,

Assuming arguendo

counsel’s supposed tactics cannot adequately explain her conduct.

that a judge acts ultra Vires

disqualiﬁcation request

is

When he

rules

0n a motion While a

pending, the request here was not pending forever. This Court denied

counsel’s request t0 prosecute an interlocutory appeal on the disqualiﬁcation issue 0n June 22,

2005. R. V01.

I,

p. 45.

The

issue

was then dead. After

that point, there certainly

was no

conceivable basis for holding off on the pursuit of testing. Yet six months elapsed after the
failure

0f the interlocutory appeal and before the

petition,

and

still

district court

no notice of hearing was ﬁled. 32679 R. 309—1

0f counsel’s plan was sound, her execution of it was anything

And

at

denied the post-conviction

any

rate the foundation

was

far

1.

Even

if the legal

foundation

but.

from sound. The

authorities relied

upon by

counsel pertain to automatic disqualiﬁcations. 32679 R. 122—28. Counsel’s motion invoked

both the automatic disqualiﬁcation provision and, in the alternative, the provision governing
disqualiﬁcations for cause. 32679 R. 122—28. But the rules leave n0 doubt that one cannot use

an automatic disqualiﬁcation “in a post-conviction proceeding, When that proceeding has been
assigned t0 the judge

who

entered the judgment 0f conviction or sentence being challenged

the post-conviction proceeding.” Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at

724 (quoting I.R.C.P.

Although counsel had arguments against the provision’s application

8

in

40(a)(8)(B)-

17

40(d)(1)(1)(ii)).8

Mr. Pizzuto’s case,

Pizzuto referred t0 an earlier version of the rule. The quoted language

now

by

it

was

appears in I.R.C.P.

surely foreseeable that this Court might reject

them

in favor

of the plain language 0f the

since the

same judge who imposed the sentence was presiding over the post—conviction

See

724—25. The bottom line

id. at

is

that counsel could not realistically

be able t0 claim the beneﬁt 0f the automatic-disqualiﬁcation
That

left

authority for the proposition that a judge lacks jurisdiction to

The

action.

that she

would

rule.

only the pursuit of a for-cause disqualiﬁcation.

disqualiﬁcation motion. 32679 R. 122—28.

assume

rule,

And prior counsel had no

manage

a case after that type of

distinction stands to reason.

It

makes sense

that

a judge would have no authority t0 supervise a case after the submission 0f a timely motion to
automatically disqualify. For then, the judge

motion Without cause, one With cause has

to

unpersuaded by the argument, in which case

power to move
in

is

removed

instantly

by operation 0f law. Unlike a

advance an argument. The courts
it

would be

senseless to deprive the judge of any

the matter forward in the interim. Signiﬁcantly, that

Mr. Pizzuto’s

own proceeding. Both the

district

may well be

judge and

this

is

precisely

What happened

Court were unconvinced by the

for-cause disqualiﬁcation motion. See Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 725—26. Simply put, counsel had

no cause

t0 expect

any court

t0 agree

with her notion that the

trial

judge was powerless t0 render

rulings While the disqualiﬁcation motion remained pending.

In essence, prior counsel placed a critical

would

later accept

in jeopardy in the

hopes that

this

her tenuous and novel legal theory. Such a gamble was ill-advised, and

consequences were, unsurprisingly,

Court
its

dire.

When the Ninth Circuit issued its
strategy

motion

was conﬁrmed. For the Ninth

opinion, the futility of prior counsel’s poorly conceived

Circuit relied

18

upon counsel’s mishandling of the

testing

ﬁnd that Mr. Pizzuto had

issue to

deny habeas

relief.

insufﬁciently pushed for factual development, and thereby t0

See Pizzuto, 947 F.3d

at

533—34. In that sense, the Ninth Circuit opinion

crystalized the ramiﬁcations 0f counsel’s unforced error.

As

a result,

it is

proper for the error t0

be the subj ect 0f the Rule 60(b) motion under review, Which was triggered by that opinion.

To absolve prior counsel of her

omissions, the district judge below incorrectly focused on

the fact that Mr. Pizzuto “did not experience a complete absence 0f meaningful representation

regardingpost—conviction
Since the issue here

is

relief.”

R. V01. V, pp. 138 1—82. That paints With too broad a brush.

what counsel did

t0

secure testing, the proper inquiry

is

into

what tasks

she accomplished t0 further that goal. With the question framed thusly, the answer becomes
plain: effectively nothing.

Counsel ﬁled a motion for testing and then did not notice

hearing or apparently pursue

it

in

any other fashion. The watchword of Eby

term the opinion uses n0 fewer than six times. 148 Idaho

at

is

it

for

“inactivity,” a

732—34. In regards t0 the issue 0f

testing—the only issue that matters—counsel’s performance was the epitome 0f inactivity.

The

district court’s citations

d0 not dictate a different

0f decisions, R. V01. V, pp. 1379—82,

On the

all

v.

State,

State,

Although

are distinguishable, both collectively

it

proffered a trio

and individually.

collective front, the ﬁrst salient fact about the cases is that they are

0f Appeals and thus not binding here. See,

The second

result.

salient fact

162 Idaho 520

159 Idaho 696

because “execution

about the cases

(Ct.

(Ct.

is

the

is

e.g.,

that

State

v.

from the Court

Skurlock, 150 Idaho 404, 406 (201

1).

none 0f them involved death sentences. See Devan

App. 2017); Dixon

v.

State,

157 Idaho 582

(Ct.

App. 2014); Bias

App. 2015). The U.S. Supreme Court announced many years ago

most irremediable and unfathomable 0f penalties,” “death

19

is

v.

that

different.”

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411

(1986). Death being different, capital cases

correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny.” California

v.

Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998—99 (1983).

That higher level of scrutiny extends t0 capital defense lawyers” work, as their

depend upon
Cir. 2006).

how they discharge

their duties.

And it extends beyond the trial

See Frierson

itself,

for

demand “a

v.

clients’ lives

Woodford, 463 F.3d 982, 993 (9th

even on appeal (and by the same token, in

post-conviction), the consequences of defense counsel’s omissions remain potentially fatal. See

Jamison

v.

Collins, 100 F. Supp.

2d 647, 740 (S.D. Ohio 2000), aﬂ’d, 291 F.3d 380 (6th

Cir.

2002) (stating that in a capital appeal, unlike a non-capital one, “any winnowing or narrowing of
issues

must be done very cautiously when a person’s

decisions relied

upon by the

district

life is at stake”).

The Court of Appeals’

judge did not grapple With those heavy stakes. They are

therefore of limited value in assessing the errors of Mr. Pizzuto’s prior post-conviction counsel.

In the event the Court looks

inapposite. In

there

beyond

Devan, post—conviction counsel determined

was “no meritorious claim”

how

she developed

it

was a Winning

by abandoning her motion

acted in the reasonable, deliberative fashion that
Pizzuto’s did not.

As

for

Dixon and Bias, there

is

is

after

162 Idaho

t0 advocate for.

prior attorney obviously felt her claim

in

fundamental difference, the cases remain

that

at 523.

That

is,

By contrast,

that

Mr. Pizzuto’s

one, and simply exercised poor judgment

for testing. In that sense, the

the

Devan lawyer

most any defendant can expect, while Mr.

n0 indication

attorney’s omissions occurred. Here, prior counsel’s reasoning

illogical.

due study and reﬂection

in those opinions as t0

is

undisputed, and

it

why the

was patently

counsel never noticed her motion for hearing because she regarded “any order

20

entered

by the

court 0n the question of testing” as “void,” Pizzuto, 947 F.3d at 5 17 n.3, a line of

made no

reasoning that simply

sense.

By staking a key request for evidentiary development entirely 0n the

success of a far-

fetched legal gambit, prior counsel did not discharge her duties, and her performance does not
survive the searching judicial scrutiny called for in this capital case. In holding otherwise, the

district court

applied an overbroad

test, utilized

inapposite precedent, and failed t0 account for

the unique standards that govern counsel’s conduct in death penalty matters.

its

discretion,

and reversal

is

It

thereby abused

warranted.

The Consequences Of Reopening The Case

C.

In the preceding sections 0f this brief, Mr. Pizzuto justiﬁes the restarting 0f this post-

conviction action.

Once

The answer

it

is

that

it

comes back

t0 life, the question is

what the Court should do

next.

ought t0 take into consideration the substantial evidence that Mr. Pizzuto

intellectually disabled

and order a hearing so the

district court

is

can fully assess such evidence.

That evidence encompasses both the submissions made earlier in the post—conviction matter, as
well as signiﬁcant material that has not yet been reviewed in state court. Keeping in
fact that the blunders

development,

it is

by prior counsel described

especially ﬁtting that the

mind

the

in the previous section relate t0 evidentiary

remedy under Rule 60(b) would be a hearing with

the elicitation of expert testimony, as laid out in this section.

As

for the evidence offered earlier in these proceedings,

the previous pleadings

and simply

the factual presentation

refers the

0n pages 16

t0 33

Mr. Pizzuto continues

to rely

on

Court to them. In particular, Mr. Pizzuto points to

of his supplemental reply brief in opposition t0

21

summary judgment, ﬁled 0n September 23, 2005, and the attachments
279, EX.

7, at

cited therein.

32679 R.

16—33. Those documents include extensive evidence 0f all three prongs of

intellectual disability.

Turning t0 the

new material, Mr.

Pizzuto primarily directs the Court to three expert

reports that have not yet been analyzed here: one
Patton, Ed.D., and one

Dr. Weinstein

by James Merikangas,

is

program

MD.

R. V01.

a neuropsychologist. R. V01.

psychology in 1981. R. Vol.

clinical

by Ricardo Weinstein, Ph.D., one by James R.

I,

in neuropsychology. R. V01.

p. 47.

pp. 46—1 17.

He was awarded a Ph.D.

in

In 1998, he completed a post-doctoral certiﬁcate

p. 66.

I,

I,

I,

p. 66.

Since then, he has had a far-ranging career in the

ﬁeld, both practicing and serving as an adjunct professor at San Diego State University. R. V01.

I,

pp. 66—67. Dr. Weinstein has published and presented

development, and neuropsychological

testing, especially as those

experiences and family dynamics. R. V01.

As

part of his

work on

on brain science, neurological

I,

this case, Dr.

themes

relate t0

childhood

pp. 67—69.

Weinstein reviewed an extensive amount 0f

documentary materials regarding Mr. Pizzuto, interviewed him personally, and tested

his IQ. R.

VdLmﬁﬁwJﬁmgwMWWWmmWMﬂk“MmﬁMmhmmmmmmmwmmn
Mr. Pizzuto was intellectually disabled within the meaning 0f three sources:

§

19-2515A;

(2) the

(“AAMR”), Which

DSM-IV; and

later

became

been accepted as authorities in

(3) the

the

Idaho Code

American Association 0n Mental Retardation

AAIDD. The DSM,

this area

(1)

the

AAMR,

and the

AAIDD have all

of law by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Hall, 572 U.S.

707—23.
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at

Dr. Weinstein gave Mr. Pizzuto the

Supreme Court pronounced
intellectual functioning.”

R. V01.

I,

p. 58,

the

WAIS

536 U.S.

at

WAIS-IV. R. V01.

I,

p. 58.

In Atkins

itself,

the U.S.

“the standard instrument in the United States for assessing

309

n.5.

Mr. Pizzuto’s

Which satisﬁes the ﬁrst prong of intellectual

0n the

full-scale score

disability Within the

test

was

60,

meaning of any

0f the authorities discussed here.
Dr. Weinstein next ventured into the second prong, that of adaptive functioning. R. V01.

I,

pp. 59—63.

To gauge Mr.

Pizzuto’s adaptive functioning, Dr. Weinstein read his social history

and declarations from individuals who knew him, and interviewed two
R. V01.

I,

p. 61.

into the extent

behavior
V01.

I,

of Mr. Pizzuto’s limitations in three general categories: conceptual adaptive

pp. 62—63.

adaptive behavior

Moore I, 137

S. Ct. at

Within these three broad

Many of those

academic

skills,

and instrumental

activities

of daily

The U.S. Supreme Court has likewise characterized these

comprising adaptive functioning. See

items.

of Mr. Pizzuto’s.

Surveying the information he gleaned from those sources, Dr. Weinstein delved

skills, social

(per curiam);

sisters

Moore

v.

Texas (Moore

II),

139

S. Ct.

living. R.

three areas as

666, 668 (2019)

1050.

classes, Dr.

Weinstein went through a series of more speciﬁc

items tracked the language 0f § 19-2515A. Both include self—direction,

abilities, interpersonal skills,

and

safety.

Compare R. V01.

I,

pp. 62—63, with § 19-

2515A(1)(a). Other areas appear substantively in both, even if slightly different nomenclature

is

used. For instance, the report looks at Mr. Pizzuto’s ability to use “expressive language,” R. V01.

I,

p. 62,

whereas the

statute

enumerates “communication” as a

23

skill area, §

19-2515A(1)(a).

Similarly, the report refers to “occupational skills,” R. V01.

term “work,”

T0

§ 19-25

1

I,

p. 63,

5A(1)(a).

better understand

how Dr.

Weinstein’s reports—and the opinions 0f the other

experts—track With the statutory deﬁnition 0f adaptive functioning,
context.

While the statute prefers the

The terminology of adaptive behavior functioning

helpful t0 have

it is

some

in the clinical deﬁnitions has evolved

over time. In Atkins, the Court quoted the clinical deﬁnitions adopted by the

AAMR and the

American Psychiatric Association (“APA”), Which were substantively the same. See Atkins, 536
U.S.

at

308

n.3.

The quoted publications from

the

APA and AAMR had the most minor of

differences in wording, such as “functional academics,

“health and safety” from the

“social/interpersonal skills,

APA. See

AAMR,

79 ‘6

compared

99 66

social skills,

to “functional

99 66

academic

community use” and
skills,”

use of community resources,” and “health, and safety” from the

id.

Idaho’s intellectual-disability statute imported Virtually verbatim the adaptive functioning

factors

from the

APA and the AAMR that were set out in Atkins.

2515A(1)(a), with Atkins, 536 U.S.
quoted, the

the

at

308

n.3.

In a

Compare Idaho Code

manual published

after the

§ 19-

one that Atkins

AAMR adopted a less complicated formulation 0f adaptive behavior.

Speciﬁcally,

AAMR incorporated a one-in—three-domain model of adaptive behavior limitations that

replaced the two-out-of—ten-or—eleven model referenced in Atkins. See R. V01.

Both the Weinstein and Patton reports addressed the ten 0r eleven

skills

I,

pp. 53, 75.

enumerated in the

adaptive behavior prong of the Idaho statute, while also analyzing them under the newer, one-in-

three-domain rubric of the

later

AAMR manual.

See R. V01.

24

I,

pp. 5 1—53, 61—64, 76—83.

In

all

events,

it is

essential questions that

apparent that Dr. Weinstein’s report and the statute are in accord on the

deﬁne adaptive functioning. And

in

answering those questions, Dr.

Weinstein found numerous instances of serious limitations in Mr. Pizzuto’s

skills

from an early

age.

To name just

a few, Dr. Weinstein determined that Mr. Pizzuto “was unable to

understand and follow instructions,” that he “could not express himself,” that he “was not able t0
learn in school,” that he “is quite gullible,” that he “has limited logic,” that he “is easily taken

advantage 0f,” and that he “has shown complete disregard for his safety and the safety of others.”
R. V01.

I,

pp. 62—63.

On the third prong,

in intellectual functioning

V01.

I,

Dr. Weinstein indicated that Mr. Pizzuto’s “limitations

and adaptive behaviors” surfaced “prior

.” R.

t0

p. 63.

His review of the three prongs completed, Dr. Weinstein articulated his opinion “Within a
reasonable degree 0f psychological certainty that Mr. Pizzuto suffers from mental retardation” as

deﬁned by Idaho Code

§ 19-25

15A, the DSM-IV, and the

AAIDD.

R. Vol.

I,

p. 64.

Dr.

Weinstein identiﬁed a number of “risk factors” that might have contributed t0 the intellectual
disability, including a

all

premature

birth,

through his developmental years,

epilepsy,

head

injuries,

I,

extreme physical, sexual and psychological abuse,”

and brain damage. R. V01.

“Mr. Pizzuto’s mental retardation
causes.” R. Vol.

79 ‘6

“tremendous amounts 0f stress, poverty and malnutrition

is

I,

p. 64.

It

was Dr. Weinstein’s View

that

the result of genetic, developmental and environmental

p. 64.
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Moving

to the next expert, Dr. Patton has a doctoral degree in the area

education from the University of Virginia. R. V01.

I,

p. 71.

0f special

Since 1977, he has worked in higher

education and has occupied faculty positions at the University of Virginia and the University of
Texas, Where he has taught courses about the characteristics 0f the intellectual disabled. R. V01.

I,

p. 71.

V01.

I,

Dr. Patton has been in the intellectual-disability ﬁeld for

p. 71.

During

that time,

more than

forty-four years. R.

he has co-authored and co-edited books on the topic and written a

variety 0f chapters and articles as well. R. V01.

I,

p. 71.

Dr. Patton served as the president of the

Division on Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities 0f the Council for Exceptional
Children, an international organization devoted to intellectual-disability issues. R. V01.

Complementing

his scholarly experience, Dr. Patton has

worked

I,

p. 72.

directly With the intellectually

disabled as a special-education teacher and diagnostician in the public school system of
Charlottesville, Virginia, as the coordinator

of a continuing-education program, and as a

participant in vocational training settings. R. V01.

Dr. Patton

I,

pp. 72—73.

was supplied with a number of social-history records, and he interviewed Mr.

Pizzuto and various people

Who knew him

as a child. R. V01.

I,

p. 74.

Pizzuto’s adaptive functioning, Dr. Patton referred primarily t0 the

V01.

I,

pp. 74—75.

He broke his

observations

down

into a series

In evaluating Mr.

AAIDD and the AAMR.

of categories,

many of which

correspond t0 the areas addressed by Dr. Weinstein and listed in § 19-2515A, such as
direction,

V01.

I,

academic performance, social

skills, safety,

pp. 76—83, with supra at 23—24.
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R.

self-

communication, and work. Compare R.

Within those
83.

areas, Dr. Patton discerned

numerous signiﬁcant

deﬁcits. R. V01.

I,

pp.

76—

Separating out just a few for representative purposes, Dr. Patton remarked that the young

Mr. Pizzuto was seen as “mentally very slow,” that “he could not talk very well,” that he
“demonstrated a consistent pattern 0f academic difficulty,” that he got held back in school and
received unusually low grades, that “[r]eading was a major problem” for him, that he “could

easily

be taken advantage

of,” that

he wore clothes backwards Without realizing

“had problems With everyday hygiene.” R. V01.

I,

pp. 76—82. Opining

on these

it,

and

that

qualities,

he

and

the detailed ﬁrst—hand accounts underlying them, Dr. Patton maintained that Mr. Pizzuto “meets

the adaptive deﬁcit prong of mental retardation.” R. V01.

Lastly, Dr.

Merikangas

and Neurology.” R. Vol.
University. R. V01.

I,

I,

is

p. 86.

p. 90.

He

I,

p. 83.

“a medical doctor trained and board certiﬁed in both Psychiatry
In 1969, he received his medical degree from Johns

Hopkins

has been on the faculty 0f the George Washington University

School of Medicine and has had various roles

at

Yale University School of Medicine, including

Chief Resident in Neurology and Assistant Clinical Professor. R. Vol.

I,

pp. 86, 91.

Numerous

professional societies have recognized Dr. Merikangas’s accomplishments, including the

American College 0f Physicians, Which made him an Elected Fellow, the American
Neuropsychiatric Association, which

Psychiatrists,

made him

Director,

Which made him President. R. V01.

I,

pp. 91, 92.

American Board 0f Psychiatry and Neurology, certiﬁed

number 0f hospitals have employed

Haven

and the American Academy of Clinical

He

is

a Diplomate of the

in both subjects. R. V01.

I,

p. 92.

Dr. Merikangas in staff appointments, including

Hospital, Yale Psychiatric Institute,

Yale-New

Georgetown University Hospital, the George

27

A

Washington University Hospital, and the Veteran’s Administration Hospital. R. V01.

I,

pp.

93. Other health facilities

have placed him in leadership positions, such as Director of the

Neuropsychiatry Program

at

Neurology Program

at

Georgetown University Hospital and Director of the Behavioral

Western Psychiatric

Institute

and

Clinic. R. V01.

I,

pp. 93—94. Dr.

Merikangas has published and lectured widely in his ﬁelds of expertise, including on
disability. R. V01.

I,

92—

intellectual

pp. 101—17.

In 2003, Dr. Merikangas administered t0 Mr. Pizzuto a neuropsychiatric examination. R.

V01.

I,

p. 86.

Several years

later, at

Dr. Merikangas’s request, several types of brain testing were

Whole Brain Perﬁlsion PET

performed, such as an Electroencephalogram, a

and an MRI. R. V01.

I,

p. 86.

frontal lobe dysfunction,

R. V01.

I,

p. 86.

From

those

tests,

Scan, a

CT

scan,

Dr. Merikangas ascertained that Mr. Pizzuto has

an atypically small brain, and more atrophy than the ordinary person.

In addition, Dr. Merikangas reviewed a collection 0f medical and social-history

documents concerning Mr. Pizzuto. R. V01.

I,

pp. 87—88.

The brain

testing

and the document

review led Dr. Merikangas t0 the conclusion “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty” that

Mr. Pizzuto “suffers from mental retardation” under Idaho Code
R. Vol.

I,

p. 88.

§ 19-25

1

5A and the DSM-IV.

Explaining that View, Dr. Merikangas stated that Mr. Pizzuto possessed an IQ

“below 70, and he exhibited signiﬁcant deﬁciencies

in

behaviors and these conditions were present before the

many

areas [in] relation to his adaptive
.” R. V01.

In post-conviction cases, “[W]hen a genuine issue 0f material fact

evidentiary hearing must be conducted.” State

v.

is

I,

pp. 88—89.

shown

to exist,

Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361 (2013). In

resolving Whether such an issue exists, the Court must “liberally construe the facts and

28

an

reasonable inferences in favor” 0f the petitioner. Hauschulz

So construed, the alleged

facts clearly entitle

qualiﬁed, experienced experts,

intellectually disabled

all

v.

State,

144 Idaho 834, 838 (2007).

Mr. Pizzuto to a hearing.

0f Whom have expounded

at length

He

has proffered three

and in

detail

0n why he

is

under the prevailing medical standards. At a bare minimum, Mr. Pizzuto

has certainly established that there

is

a genuine issue 0f material fact as to his intellectual

disability.

Aside from qualifying for an evidentiary hearing under Idaho law, Mr. Pizzuto has a right
to

one pursuant

t0 the U.S. Constitution.

As

referenced earlier, the Ninth Circuit held that this

Court’s ruling 0n Mr. Pizzuto’s Atkins claim could not be reconciled With several
decisions from the U.S.

intimated that

supra

at 3.

it

would be appropriate

One 0f the

state court’s

Supreme Court on

The Ninth

intellectual disability.

Circuit further

Court a chance to apply those authorities. See

t0 give this

authorities at issue is

Brumﬁeld. See Pizzuto, 947 F.3d

requirement 0f an IQ 0f 70 0r below

more recent

is

contrary t0

.

.

.

Brumﬁeld

529 (“[T]he

at

.

.

.

.”); id. at

35 (“Although the Idaho courts rejected Pizzuto’s Atkins claim in 2008, they did so
the beneﬁt of the

Supreme Court’s

In Brumﬁeld, a death

See 135

S. Ct. at

decision[] in

row inmate

.

.

.

Brumﬁeld

.

.

.

.

.

.

534—

without

.”).

asserted an Atkins claim in a state post-conviction case.

2274. Relying upon documentary evidence 0f intellectual disability, Mr.

Brumﬁeld pursued an

evidentiary hearing 0n the matter. See

id.

The

state courts rej ected the

claim Without a hearing and Without authorizing funds for more investigation, ﬁxating on one 75

IQ score

in the record.

See

id. at

2275. That was unreasonable, the U.S. Supreme Court said,

29

because

“it is

unconstitutional t0 foreclose

because a capital defendant

For

all intents

is

deemed

to

all

further exploration of intellectual disability simply

have an IQ above 70.”

and purposes, Mr. Pizzuto

is

Id. at

2278.

identically situated t0

Mr. Brumﬁeld. Like

Mr. Brumﬁeld, Mr. Pizzuto has brought forward substantial documentary evidence 0f intellectual
Like Mr. Brumﬁeld, Idaho’s threshold for evidentiary hearings

disability.

“reasonable doubt” in Louisiana, see
fact here, see

supra

at 28.

id. at

is

relatively low: a

2281, and the presence of a genuine issue of material

Like Mr. Brumﬁeld, then, there

is

a constitutional obligation to afford

Mr. Pizzuto an evidentiary hearing on his claim.
V.

The Court

CONCLUSION

faces a stark choice: either let a

man be

executed even though

opinion upholding his death sentence was unscientiﬁc then and

is

its

previous

unconstitutional now, or allow

the parties t0 present evidence at a hearing so that the Idaho judiciary can ﬁnally render a fully

informed and correct ruling on his claim. In
additional process

the Eighth

is

more than justiﬁed

this capital case,

t0 ensure that

such a modest measure 0f

Mr. Pizzuto

is

not executed in Violation of

Amendment.

Based on the foregoing, Mr. Pizzuto respectfully asks

for the district court’s decision

denying his Rule 60(b) motion t0 be reversed and for the case to be remanded so an evidentiary
hearing can be held 0n whether he

Amendment by Virtue 0f his
remittitur

is

constitutionally insulated

intellectual disability.

from execution under the Eighth

In the alternative, he requests that the

be recalled in case number 32679 and the same relief afforded.

Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of April 2020.

3O

/s/

Jonah

Jonah

J

.

J.

Horwitz

Horwitz

Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant
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